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COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
not determine the meaning of a word or phrase in an insurance policy. Insur-
ance law is largely statutory. More often than not, a case involving an insurance
policy will be determined not by reference to the principles of contract law
but by reference to applicable provisions of the New York insurance statutes.
The instant case is a reminder however that insurance law is not governed en-
tirely by statute-that, when there is not an applicable provision of the
insurance statute that solves a given case, resort must be had to common-law
contract law because an insurance policy is fundamentally a contract. Such
resort was held in the instant case in order to determine the meaning of the
word "employee."
LABOR LAW
FEDERAL PREEMPTION op STATE JUISDICTION IN LABOR CASES
The New York courts have in the past applied the doctrine that in an
alleged labor dispute they will resolve all doubts about jurisdiction in favor
of state courts and against NLRB jurisdiction. The ostensible reason for this
policy was that if relief was denied by the state court, and it was later decided
that the state in fact had jurisdiction, then irreparable harm may have been
done to the plaintiff, or possibly a just grievance may have been foreclosed
from judicial or administrative- correction altogether. If the United States Su-
preme Court decided that in a particular case the state had over-stepped its
jurisdictional limits, it could set the case aright, and in the process illumine that
area of the law for future state guidance.
Without going into the merits of the above policy or its rationale, the
Court of Appeals dramatically and unequivocally reversed itself in Dooly v.
Anton.2 The facts of the Dooly case are relatively simple. Two minority unions
were engaged in peaceful picketing (found by the lower court to be recog-
nitional) of plaintiff's meat purveying establishment at the same time that
plaintiff recognized and had a contract with an independent union which
represented a majority of the employees. The employer sought and obtained
an injunction in the Supreme Court, Special Term, permanently restraining
such picketing by the defendant minority unions, which injunction was affirmed
by the Appellate Division. a
The lower courts relied upon Pleasant Vally Packing Co. v. Talarico,3 a
case with a similar factual situation except that there the majority union
was certified by the National Labor Relations Board. The Court of Appeals
in the Pleasant Valley case held that such activity was neither an unfair labor
practice under Section 8 (B) (4) (C), nor protected under Section 7, of the
1. Pleasant Valley Packing Co. v. Talarico, 5 N.Y2d 40, 177 N.YS.2d 473 (1958).
2. 8 N.Y.2d 91, 202 N.YS.2d 273 (1960).
2a. 7 A.D.2d 880, 182 N.Y.S.2d 314 (4th Dep't 1959).
3. Supra note 1.
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Taft-Hartley Act.4 Although admitting there was a possibility that Sec-
tion 8(B) (4) (C), which makes it an unfair labor practice for a minority union
to picket an employer seeking recognition as exclusive bargaining agent where
another union is certified as the bargaining representative of the employees,
might apply to make the minority unions activity an unfair labor practice
under the federal act, the Court nevertheless held that any doubt must be
resolved in favor of state jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that since there was
no strike within the meaning of 8(B) (4) (C) the Section did not apply and
the state courts were not preempted. An extended analysis of the above con-
clusion would serve no useful purpose in view of its reversal by Dooly v. Anton,
but reference to a few Supreme Court cases will reveal its doubtful validity in
the light of Section 13.5
In the Dooly case the Court of Appeals, while noting that the factual
situation' was almost identical with Pleasant Valley, declined to follow it and
instead rested its decision upon a major Supreme Court case in state-federal
labor matters, San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,6 decided sub-
sequent to the Pleasant Valley case. The Garmon case laid down the doctrine
that when conduct is the subject of reasonable argument whether it is regulated
by either Section 7 or Section 8 of the Federal Act, then the National Labor
Relations Board-is the exclusive tribunal to resolve such issues. This was
required, the Supreme Court stated, "... if the danger of state interference
with national policy is to be averted. '" 7 The Court of Appeals admitted that in
Pleasant Valley the question whether section 8(B)(4)(C) proscribed the
minority unions'picketing was arguable, indicating that if Garnon had been
decided at the time of Pleasant Valley that the Court would have deferred to
the exclusive jurisdiction of the NILRB.
The Court of Appeals was not quite sure, however, if the instant case was
regulated by either Section 7 or Section 8 of the Federal Act in the light of a
very recent Supreme Court decision in NLRB v. Drivers, Chauffeurs, Hclpers,
Local Union (Curtis Bros.).8 In the Curtis case a minority union was enjoined
4. Labor Management Relations Act, U.S.C.A. § 15S:
(B) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents ...
(4) to engage in, or induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage
in a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manu-
facture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles,
materials or commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof
is: . . . (C) forcing or requiring any employer to recognize or bargain with a
particular labor organization as the representative of his employees if another
labor organization has been certified as the representative of such employees under
the provisions of section 159 of this title.
5. Nothing in this act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be con-
strued so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right
to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right. -
(Following the requirement of Section 13 picketing has been equated with striking. See
N.L.R.B. v. International Rice Miling Co., 341 U.S. 665 (1951).)
6. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
7. Id. at 246.
8. - U.S. -, So Sup. Ct. 706 (1960).
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by the NLRB for peaceful recognitional picketing where 6 months previously,
in a Board conducted election, the employees voted no union. The Board held
this was peaceful recognitional picketing proscribed by Section 8(B) (1) (A),
which prohibits a union from engaging in activity that "restrains or coerces"
employees in their exercise of Section 7 rights.9 But the Supreme Court held
in the Curtis case, reversing the Board, that Section 8(B)(1)(A) does not
prohibit peaceful recognitional picketing. They stated ". . . Rather it seems
clear, and we hold, that Congress in the Taft-Hartley Act authorized the
Board to regulate peaceful recognitional picketing only when it is em-
ployed to accomplish objectives specified in Section 8(B) (4); and that Section
8(B) (1) (A) is a grant of power to the Board limited to authority to proceed
against union tactics involving violence, intimidation, and reprisal or threats
thereof-conduct involving more than the general pressures on persons em-
ployed by the affected employers implicit in economic strikes."'1 Following
the reasoning of the Supreme Court in the Curtis case the Court of Appeals
in Dooly concluded that defendant unions did not violate Section 8(B) (1) (A).
The Court next faced the issue of whether the picketing was protected by
Section 7. While feeling that it might not be protected by Section 7 because
conducted for an unlawful objective, i.e. to induce the employer to breach a
contract with an independent majority union, the Court nevertheless held it
was arguably within the protection of Section 7 and hence preempted by the
Board under the Garmon doctrine.
The decision was also rested upon the additional ground that the Landrum-
Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act' made moot the
question in this case by the addition of Section 8(B) (7), which makes it un-
lawful to picket for recognition in the face of a majority union recognized by
the employer, there being no issue of representation under Section 9 existing.
In any event, the Court felt that it was the Board's prerogative to decide
whether Section 8(B) (7) had been violated in the first instance.
The Court dearly interpreted the Garmon case correctly and appropriately
applied it to the instant case. Under any reasonable interpretation of the
Curtis case, it is arguable that the picketing involved here was protected by
Section 7. Whether the picketing involved here was violative of some other
provision of Section 8(B) which the Court overlooked is not germane to the
real significance of this case. This is so because the same result would follow,
for any other violation 'of Section 8(B) would, under Garman, still preempt
the state court and remain in the exclusive province of the Board. The Court,
9. § 8(B)(1)(A):
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents ...
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in section 157 of this itle....
(Section 157 gives employees the right to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing.)
10. Supra note 8 at 715.
11. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, § 707, 73 Stat. 549,
29 U.S.C.A. § 158B(7).
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perhaps incorrectly, stated the criterion to be used when picketing is carried
on for an unlawful objective or by unlawful means, thus losing its protection
under Section 7.12 This does not, however, detract from the Court's achieve-
ment of its main objective in establishing and expounding the Garmon case
doctrine as the guiding principle for preemption cases in labor disputes in-
volving interstate commerce in New York.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
MIVUNICIPALITY CAN WAIvE A CONTRACTUAL LIMITATION ON BRINGING ACTION
In a contract action by a building contractor against a municipal corpora-
tion, Planet Construction Corp. v. Board of Education of The City of New York,1
for extra labor and materials allegedly furnished in connection with a con-
struction contract, the Court of Appeals in a four to three decision held, that
even though the contract contained a provision limiting time for commence-
ment of action on the contract to one year, and although the action was not
brought within that time, the judge at Special Term erred in granting summary
judgment for the defendant, Board of Education. Defendant's issuing of a
change order after the one-year period of the contract limitation and deducting
from the amount due under the contract at a time when it claimed plaintiff
had lost its right to sue presented triable issues as to waiver of the contract
limitation or estoppel to assert the contract limitation.
By statute,2 a municipal corporation is forbidden to waive the defense of
the Statute of Limitations.3 In erroneously granting summary judgment,
Special Term, and the Appellate Division,4 held that because of defendant's
unique position as a municipal corporation, it could not waive the contract
provision limiting action on the contract to one year and hence defendant could
12. The Court of Appeals states that the conduct involved in the instant case might
lose its protection under § 7 if it was carried on for an unlawful objective, and hence be
subject to a state court injunction. The Court felt that the attempt on the part of the
minority union to force recognition and thus to cause the employer to break his contract
with the majority union was conduct that a state might enjoin. This would be erroneous
for the state may only act where such conduct involves violence, (N.L.R.B. v. Fansteel,
306 U.S. 240---sit down strike) or an unlawful objective (Southern S.S. Co. v. N.L.R.B.
316 U.S. 31-mutiny). This is not the type of conduct involved in the instant case nor
even approaching it. These are areas for the proper exercise of the police power, not labor
regulation.
1. 7 N.Y.2d 381, 198 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1960).
2. N.Y. General City Law § 20(5) authorizes a municipality:
To spend money for any public or municipal purpose; to pay or compromise
claims equitably, payable by the city, though not constituting obligations legally
.binding on it, but it shall have no power to waive the defense of the statute of
limitations or to grant extra compensation to any public officer, servant or con-
tractor. (Emphasis added.)
3. Six years is the ordinary limit for bringing an action on a contract [N.Y. Civ.
Prac. Act § 48()].
4. 8 A.D.2d 781, 187 N.YS.2d 979 (1st Dep't 1959).
